The Papers of James Madison, Volume 3: *3 March 1781—31 December 1781.* Edited by WILLIAM T. HUTCHINSON and WILLIAM M. E. RACHAL. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1963.—xxv, 381 pp. $10.00.

This third volume of the Madison papers covers the last ten months of 1781, during which time the thirty-year-old Madison continued to be a member of the Virginia delegation in Congress. Of the 174 papers included, only twenty-two have ap-peared, in whole or in part, in earlier editions of Madison's writings. Like the two preceding volumes, this one is thor-oughly annotated and contains the letters received by Madison as well as those written by him, and also the motions, resolu-tions, petitions, and reports involving him, the Virginia delega-tion, and the committees of which he was a member. Madison's letters, clear and pertinent, are pedestrian; those to him are al-most always more colorful; those of Edmund Pendleton are particularly notable for their sagacity and virile English.

During 1781, until the Yorktown campaign, Virginia bore the brunt of the revolutionary fighting and the succoring of the

Carolinas. The Madison correspondence is filled with bitter complaints about Virginia's military and civilian hardships, the neglect of her by Congress and the other states, the extravagant living of those to the north who speculated in trade and America's sick currency and engrossed goods desperately needed by patriot armies in the South. Political leaders watched anxiously every move in the power-politics game in Europe, feared France was diverting too much aid to Spain for attacks on Gibraltar and Minorca, saw clearly that the final outcome would turn on the control of American waters by naval power, and prayed for that French fleet which finally came and made possible the victory at Yorktown.

Madison concentrated on getting reinforcements and supplies for the patriot armies in the South, tightening non-intercourse with Britain, devising measures of retaliation for British atrocities, guarding against any provision in the peace treaty which would require readmission of Tories and remission of their properties, defining the commercial rights of neutrals and belligerents. Fearing that Eastern interests in trade and fisheries would be given priority in the peace-making, Madison was one of those who kept alive the importance of securing the Mississippi River as the Western boundary and the free navigation of that river through Spanish-held Louisiana, even though legislatures in those Southern states now fighting for their very survival were less insistent on these matters than they once had been.

Foreshadowing his future federalism, Madison favored strengthening the Articles of Confederation, as shown by his support of congressional authority to settle the Vermont controversy between New Hampshire and New York, of the motion to compel each state to redeem its quota of old continental money, of an interpretation or an amendment of the Articles to allow Congress a direct revenue to be paid to collectors designated by the Congress (a truly federal power), and by his proposed amendment (pp. 17–18) to make explicit Congress' "general and implied power" to employ economic and even military sanctions to compel laggard states to furnish their allocated quotas of money and troops. At this time, much of Madison's nationalism came out of the South's desperate need for Confederation help.

After Yorktown, divisive forces came even more to the fore and it was soon clear that the big question of the future would be whether peace and union could be made to coexist. Ironically enough, there is more in the Madison correspondence about the concern felt in Virginia over a congressional committee report rejecting Virginia's conditions appended to her cession of her Western lands than there is about the rejoicing over Yorktown.

Illustrative of the non-inevitability of history, the flexibility of politicians, and our over-stereotyping of historical figures is a letter of Madison to Jefferson (p. 308), suggesting that Virginia chart her future course on the presumption that "the present Union will but little survive the present war" and that the state "ought to be as fully impressed with the necessity of the Union during the war as of its probable dissolution after it."

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